poses an unprecedented number of threats that can compromise a wireless client's identity, personal data, and network integrity. The AP impersonation attack is conducted by establishing rogue AP with spoofed Service Set Identifier (SSID) and MAC address same as the target legitimate AP. Since these identities can be easily forged, there is no identifier can be used to identify the legitimate AP. Due to strong correlation between the AP signal strength and the distance, in this paper, we propose a clientcentric AP spoofing detection framework by exploiting the statistical relationship of signal strength from the legitimate and rogue APs. We show the relationship between the signals can be determined by using two classical partitioning-based clustering methods, K-means and Kmedoids analysis. The experimental results show that both analysis methods can achieve over 90% detection rate.
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of wireless network in public places such as universities, cafes, airports, commercial buildings and hotels provides seamless internet access connectivity anywhere at any time to the wireless clients. Even though many wireless networks are often unprotected, unmanaged and unencrypted, this does not prevent the client from actively connecting to the network. The real problem is that the network Access Point (AP) is always trusted. The adversary can impersonate a legitimate AP (LAP) or setup a rogue AP (RAP) to commit espionage, and to launch evil-twin attack, session hijacking, session side-jacking and eavesdropping [1, 2] . Moreover, the impersonation of LAP allows the adversary to conduct Denial of Service (DoS) attack, bypass control mechanism, or falsely advertise services to client [3] .
The underlying premise of setting up RAP is to imitate the LAP so that adversary can attract the client who trying to get the connectivity through what they believe to be LAP. To masquerade the LAP, the adversary launches the spoofing attack by forging the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and MAC address same as LAP but with stronger signal strength. The primary step to restrain the threat of RAP is to detect the presence of spoofing attack.
In this paper, we explore the AP spoofing attack detection by using wireless physical-layer information namely Received Signal Strength (RSS). We propose a client-centric detection framework where the client passively monitors and sniffs the RSS of the wireless frames before the client begins to associate with target AP. The detection approach will alert the client once the target AP is classified as RAP. The framework is capable to detect the threats without the assistance from a network administrator and without the support of extra network infrastructure such as monitoring sensors. Moreover, the framework only activates the detection when the clients are trying to connect to network or to re-connect once they are disconnected. Therefore, it is resource saving detection method. For detecting the spoofing attack threat, in this work, we adapt the work undertaken in [3, 4] and [5] . Then, we extend their work by comparing the performance of detection mechanism by using partitioning-based clustering methods, K-means and Kmedoids. In those works, by clustering of RSS sequences from multiple APs, the spoofing attack can be detected since the RSS sequences are not highly correlated to each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the recent work of spoofing detection. Section 3 provides an overview on spoofing attack and then formulates the attack detection problem. Section 4 proposes a client-centric AP spoofing framework by using partitioning-based clustering methods. Section 5 presents the experimental results and evaluates the performance of the clustering methods. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Several works have been reported in the literature on wireless spoofing attack detection. Most of the detection mechanisms focus on the intrinsic properties of MAC-layer headers and wireless physical-layer information. Both layers are generally independent of higher-layer protocols and not encrypted [6] . Existing mechanisms for detecting spoofing attack include the irregularities of MAC sequence number, beacon frame Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) and the correlation of RSS sequences.
MAC sequence number has been used in [7] to perform spoofing attack detection. In this mechanism, it assumes that LAP produces a linearly increasing sequence number. Hence, any dramatic changes or abnormal gap in sequence number from the same MAC address indicates a spoofing attack. However, the availability of open-source drivers and reverseengineered firmware allow per frame sequence number manipulation. Thus, MAC header field can be spoofed [8] .
On the other hand, Martinez et al. proposed the detection mechanism by monitoring the IAT of two consecutive beacon frames [9] . The spoofing attack is detected whenever the IAT is not satisfied the regular beacon interval.
Recent works focus on the monitoring of the per-frame RSS in order to develop the dynamic profile of the wireless device or to partition RSS sequences from the LAP and RAP. Many of the commercial 802.11 wireless cards provide per-frame RSS measurement. Sheng et al. proposed to build RSS profile between the transmitter or AP and sniffer by using Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [6] . Once the profile is established, any abrupt or unusual RSS pattern deviation from the constructed profile is considered as a potential spoofing attack. This mechanism requires infrastructural commitment to place the sniffers in the network.
This work investigates the use of RSS spatial correlation to detect the spoofing attack. RSS sequence from the AP is highly correlated with the distance in the physical space. RSS is hard to falsify and it is unspoofable. Under non-spoofing attack scenario, if the RSS sequence from one AP is partitioned into two sequences, those two sequences are highly correlated to each other. In contrast, the presence of spoofing attack causes the mixture of the RSS sequences from the LAP and RAP. These two RSS sequences are correlated to the distinct locations and thus not highly correlated to each other. Several works have been proposed to separate the RSS sequences in order to detect the spoofing attack. The mechanisms include median filtering [10] , normalization technique [11] , Pearson correlation coefficient [12] , Kmeans clustering [3, 4] and K-medoids clustering [5] . In this work, we propose a client-centric AP spoofing detection framework by adapting the work undertaken in [3, 4, 5] . We use partitioning-based clustering methods, K-means and K-medoids, to separate the RSS sequences from APs.
III. DETECTING ACCESS POINT SPOOFING ATTACKS
In this section, we describe a brief overview of spoofing attack. Then, we formulate the spoofing attack detection problem in IEEE 802.11 wireless network. This section also discusses the experimental methodology that we use to evaluate the detection framework.
A. Spoofing Attacks
Spoofing attack occurs when malicious adversary impersonates another device or user in order to gain access to restricted resources or to steal information. Spoofing attacks provide a rich set of ways for identity thieves and corporate espionage agents to launch a variety of traffic injection, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and RAP. Phishing AP or Evil Twin AP is a term of RAP that intentionally deployed by the adversary to impersonate LAP and to trick the victim to connect to it through the illegitimate connection [13] . RAP is established by imitating all the configurations of the LAP namely SSID, MAC address, operating channel, and etc. Since the SSID and MAC address of the AP are easily forged by the adversary, there is no other form of identification to identity the LAP.
Adversary that launches the spoofing attack allows his RAP to advertise the same SSID as that of the LAP. This may cause the wireless client to unwittingly connect to the RAP. Moreover, the adversary can force a DoS or deauthentication attack to the LAP to interrupt existing connections, and then waits for the client to re-connect and to trap into RAP. In addition, for IEEE 802.11 networks, the clients select AP by the strength of the receiving signal. The adversary only needs to ensure that his RAP has greater signal strength as seen by the client. To accomplish that, the adversary tries to place his RAP nearer to the client than LAP.
B. Formulation of Attack Detection
In IEEE 802.11 wireless network, RSS is a measure of relative power level being received by the physical layer at the antenna. The Radio Frequency (RF) signal strength can be measured in either an absolute decibel milliwatts (dBm) or relative manner such as Radio Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI). The strength of RF signal is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between AP and wireless client. Moreover, the signal is further deteriorated by signal absorption, reflection, refraction, and interferences [14] . In general, RSS is closely correlated with the location in physical space. RSS sample values that are collected at the same physical location are similar or fluctuate around the mean value. Conversely, RSS sample values at different locations in physical space are distinctively varied [5] .
The variation of RSSs as perceived by the wireless client is clearly shown in Fig. 1 . This figure exhibits two important scenarios: non-spoofing attack and under spoofing attack. In the first phase of the variation, the values of RSS which emanating from single LAP are normally exhibit low fluctuation. However, when the RAP exists in the physical space and launches spoofing attack, there is a rapid fluctuation of RSS sample values due to the mixture of two separate RSS sequences, one from LAP and one from RAP.
Due to this observation, it is impossible for an adversary to accurately imitate RSS of the LAP as perceived by the wireless client. Unless, the adversary will need to be at exact location with LAP and use the same set of radio equipment. Therefore, this intrinsic property of IEEE 802.11 wireless network is useful as it is unspoofable and computationally inexpensive to measure. The real problem is how to feasibly distinguish the aforementioned scenarios. This observation suggests that we can perform cluster analysis on the received RSS sample values to find the distance in signal space. By using clustering method, we can partition the RSS sample values into k disjoint clusters since the RSS of beacon frames that are coming from different locations are distinctive. 
C. Experimental Methodology
To empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our detection framework, a set of experiment was conducted at second floor of FIST building. The floor consists of three computer laboratories as depicted in Fig. 2 . The deployed 802.11 network is equipped with home wireless router TP-LINK TL-WR740N as LAP. Acer Netbook with 150 Mbps TP-LINK TL-WN721N USB Wireless Adapter is used as wireless client and RSS collection terminal. To imitate the LAP, we run hostapd [15] as soft AP on Ubuntu-based Lenovo Y500 Series Notebook with 150 Mbps TP-LINK TL-WN727N USB Wireless Adapter. The small red stars on the floor map are the locations used for RAP to launch the spoofing attack.
In these experiments, we launch the spoofing attack at 24 different locations across the floor. At each location, we collect 20 sets of RSS sequences. Each RSS sequence consists of 100 frame-level RSS sample values. To extract the RSS sample value from beacon frame, we write sniffing script using scapy, a python-based packet crafting tool [16] . In this work, we assume the situation where the client is stationary and its location is fixed at one location which is the centre of the testing floor, and the RAP locations are scattered in physical space. We emulate the real public wireless network by assuming that RAP attempts to launch spoofing attack against the wireless client in different location from the LAP's real location. Under normal scenario or non-spoofing attack, the RSS sample values are from LAP only whereas under spoofing attack, RAP at one of pre-determined locations will be activated and hence the RSS samples values from same identifiers APs, i.e. same SSID and MAC address, are the mixture between two RSS sequences from LAP and RAP. Clustering is an unsupervised learning technique which is used for exploratory data mining and analysis. The technique groups a set of objects into groups of similar objects. Such groups are called clusters. A cluster is defined as a division of objects which are similar between them and are dissimilar to the objects grouping to other clusters. Clustering methods are extensively deployed in various fields such as machine learning, pattern recognition, image analysis, information retrieval, bioinformatics, economics and etc. In general, clustering methods can be classified into several categories: partitioning, hierarchical, grid-based, density-based, and model-based. In this paper, we aim to explore two classical partitioning-based clustering methods to detect AP spoofing, namely K-means and K-medoids.
Partitioning-based clustering method is a one-level partitioning where n data objects are grouped into k disjoint clusters. The goal of this clustering method is to optimize a chosen dissimilarity function by iteratively relocating the data objects between clusters until a locally optimal partition is achieved. The most intuitive and popular dissimilarity function is squared Euclidean distance. Equation (1) is the definition of squared Euclidean distance between two data objects. 
A. K-means K-means is perhaps the most widely used clustering method [17] . The basic principle is to represent each cluster by its mean value, i.e. centroid. All data objects are grouped into clusters by examining dissimilarity between each data object and centroids. In other words, the data object is assigned to the nearest centroid. Once all data objects are bound to the clusters, the new centroid is recalculated over the data objects assigned to the respective cluster and the entire procedure is repeated until the centroid is converged. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for K-means clustering. 
B. K-medoids
K-means clustering is popular due to its easy implementation and fast convergence, however, it is sensitive to outliers. A data objects with an extremely large value may substantially distort the distribution of data [18] . Instead of taking mean value as the centroid of the cluster where it is not necessarily to be a real data object in the cluster, medoid can be used to represent the cluster. A medoid is data object itself and it is the most centrally data object in the cluster. K-medoid or partitioning around medoids (PAM) is more robust in the presence of noise and outliers in comparison with Kmeans clustering [19] . Pseudocode of K-medoids clustering is shown in Algorithm 2.
Each cluster is initialized by arbitrarily selecting k of the n data objects to be medoids. The remaining data objects are grouped into the same cluster as the medoid that it is closest to under the chosen dissimilarity function. Once the partitioning process is completed, a new medoid is selected from non-medoid data objects and the two objects are swapped. Then, the total dissimilarity cost of the configuration is computed. Configuration with the lowest total dissimilarity cost is selected and the entire procedure is repeated until the medoid is converged.
C. AP Spoofing Detection Framework
In this section, we present client-centric AP spoofing detection framework by using partitioning-based clustering method as shown in Fig. 3 . This framework extends the functionalities of the wireless client's device by increasing its awareness towards APs in the vicinity. The client passively monitors and sniffs the wireless frame traffics when the client begins to associate with the AP. The detection framework will alert the client once the target AP is classified as RAP. Our detection framework consists of three phases: collection of RSS, classifications of RSS and AP spoofing detection. Figure 3 . Client -centric spoofing attack detection framework
Collection of RSS:
In this phase, the wireless client passively sniffs the RSSs from the target SSID. The client listens to the beacon frames that, by default, are sent every 100 milliseconds. Then, the RSS sample values are extracted from radiotap header from the received beacon frames. A sequence of RSSs is represented as data object, X . Apart from that, the client also will extract the detection threshold, th  , which is advertised in beacon frame. The AP embeds the threshold in the extra Information Element (IE) in the beacon frame. This enables clients to use the information to detect the attack without association to the target AP.
Classification of RSS:
In this phase, we use cluster analysis particularly K-means and K-medoids to partition the received RSS sequence into two clusters. In this work, regardless how many RAPs that launch the spoofing attacks, we only aim to detect the presence of attacks. The strong spatial correlation between RSS and location in physical space make one or multiple spoofing attacks disrupt the distribution of RSS sequences. Therefore, by setting 2 k  , the classification phase is capable to determine the disturbance to the RSS sequences [5] . The distance between centroids or medoid, D will result in larger distance. This is due to the fact that, centroids or medoids are derived from multiple RSS sequences associated with different physical locations.
AP Spoofing Detection: We formulate AP spoofing detection framework as a sequential hypothesis testing problem. We define two hypotheses 0 H and 1 H as follows: 0 H is the null hypothesis that no spoofing attack is detected, i.e. only one LAP exists whereas 1 H is alternative hypothesis that spoofing attack is detected and alarm needs to be raised, i.e. LAP and RAP co-exist in the physical space. 
where th  is detection threshold. The detection threshold is empirically determined during training stage.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here, we present the experimental result of AP spoofing detection framework. First, we investigate the distance between centroids or medoids in signal space under non-spoofing attack and under spoofing attack. Next, we evaluate the performance of detection framework. We quantify the performance using the following metrics: True Positive Rate (TPR) -the fraction of LAP correctly detected and False Positive Rate (FPR) -the fraction of RAP identified as LAP (e.g., false alarm). Lastly, we discuss the accuracy of the detection framework at each testing location. 
A. Spatial Correlation of RSS

B. Detection Threshold
Detection threshold th  defines the critical region for the spoofing attack detection to be robust against false alarms. Fig. 5 illustrates the detection rate, i.e. TPR, and FPR under different threshold settings. To achieve FPR less than 5%, the detection rates for K-means and Kmedoids are 70% and 65% respectively, under th  = 2.239 dBm. By setting a slightly higher threshold, the detection framework can obtain better detection rate. For instance, K-means with th  = 4 dBm records more than 95% detection rate whereas K-medoids can obtain the same detection rate with lower th  . However, both methods show an increment in FPR up to 15%. As discussed in the previous section,  is set to be in this range, the result shows we can obtain higher detection rate. But, the detection framework generates a lot of false alarms at the same time. High percentage of false alarms is caused by the location of LAP and RAP in the physical space. We will discuss the finding in the next section.
C. Detection Accuracy
In this section, we investigate the detection accuracy at each RAP testing locations. We define the detection accuracy as the fraction of the combination between LAP correctly detected and RAP correctly identified. Fig. 6 shows the detection accuracy when th  = 2.239 dBm and the FPR is kept less than 5%. The result exhibits there are two locations in physical space cause the deterioration of the detection accuracy. Referring to Fig 2, RAP at L12 and L24 is about the same distance with the location of LAP as perceived by the wireless client. Thus, RSS sequences from both LAP and RAP are fluctuated around the same mean. Therefore, the detection framework performs poorly at those two locations. K-means respectively, and the FPR is kept less than 15%. As we can observe, the higher percentage of FPR is mainly caused by false alarms generated at locations L12 and L24. Moreover, the higher detection threshold also contributes to the accuracy deterioration at some other locations in the physical space. For instance, L19 is mainly located behind the thick concrete wall. Even though the adversary located the RAP near to the client, but the severe obstruction affects the signal strength coming from RAP.
As overall, since the RSS sequence is highly correlated with the distance, we found that the performance of AP spoofing detection framework by using partitioning-based clustering method is effective when the locations of the LAP and RAP are distinct in the physical space. However, it is interesting to notice that the detection framework suffers from many false positives whenever the attenuation of RSS sequences from APs exhibits the similarity due to multipath propagation effect and when the wireless client is stationed at equal-distance away between the APs. Moreover, as comparison between Kmeans and K-medoids clustering methods, K-medoids shows better detection rate for any th  value. However, at the same time, K-medoids also exhibits high FPR as compared to K-means. Since K-medoids is robust against the RSS outliers, we can observe that the m D between two RSS sequences is relatively small against c D . Figure 6 . Detection accuracy when the FPR is kept less than 5% Figure 7 . Detection accuracy when the FPR is kept less than 15%
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a spoofing detection framework to protect the wireless client against the AP impersonation attack. The framework measures the correlation of RSS values from the target AP in order to determine whether the sequence is from the LAP only or the mixture of RSS values from LAP and RAP. Using partitioning-based clustering methods, namely K-means and K-medoids, we group the RSS sequence into two clusters. We found that if the RSS values are coming from LAP only, the distance between centroids or medoids is relatively small compared to the RSS values that are emanating from RAP and LAP. Therefore, we exploit this property to detect the presence of spoofing attack. Even though the framework can achieve more than 90% detection rate, it is worth noting that many false alarms are raised at some locations in the testing environment due to numerous obstacles and the client to have equal-distance away between legitimate and rogue APs. This finding may warrant further research in the future.
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